Fast Analytical Rank Estimation

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Given an **implementation** of a **symmetric encryption algorithm** and the **secret key**

Our **goal** is:

To estimate the **strength** of the **secret key**

against side channel attacks





Secret Key

128 bits

\$%\$#@!@#\$%^&*&^%\$%^&%^%#@\$%^&\$#@\$%^&#@!#\$!~!#%&\$*&!^\$%^&\$#@\$%^&#@!#\$!~!



Divide-and-Conquer

The attacker **reveals a small part** of bits each time

• Denoted by subkeys



Secret Key

8 bits 8

| Side Channel Atta | ack sbit | s | 8 bits | 8 bits | |
|-------------------|-------------|---------|-------------|------------|--|
| Secret Key | \$%\$#@! | @# | @\$%^#&*! | ^*\$*\$&@% | |
| | The first S | ubkey | | | |
| | Subkeys | Pr | obabilities | | |
| | 0000000 - | > | 0.00001 | | |
| | 0000001 - | > | 0.00004 | | |
| | 0000010 - | > | 0.00005 | | |
| | 00000011 — | > | 0.002 | | |
| | 00000100 — | > | 0.004 | | |
| | 00000101 - | | 0.003 | | |
| | 00000110 — | | 0.001 | | |
| | 00000111 — | | 0.003 | | |
| | 00001000 — | | 0.002 | | |
| | | | | | |
| | 11111110 — | | 0.0004 | | |
| | 11111111 - | | 0.0002 | | |



. Side Chann



| nannel Attack 🖊 | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|--------|-----------|------------|--|
| | 8 b | its 💦 | 8 bits | 8 bits | |
| Secret Key | \$%\$#@ | 0!@# | @\$%^#&*! | ^*\$*\$&@% | |
| - AND | The first | Subkey | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | (P ₁ ,K | 1) | | | |
| | 00010100 | 0.0010 | | | |
| | 10110111 | 0.005 | | | |
| | 11011011 | 0.005 | | | |
| Sorted subkovs | 01000011 | 0.0045 | | | |
| Softed Subreys | 01110000 | 0.0043 | | | |
| in decreasing | 11011010 | 0.003 | | | |
| ordor of | 10101110 | 0.003 | | | |
| order or | 01001111 | 0.002 | | | |
| probabilites | 10100110 | 0.0015 | | | |
| - | | | | | |

| 10100110 | 0.0015 | | | |
|-----------|----------|--|--|--|
| | | | | |
| 0000000 | 0.000001 | | | |
| 111111111 | 0.000001 | | | |

Secret Key



Sorted subkeys in decreasing order of probabilites

| k | 8 bits \$%\$#@!@# | | | 8 bits @\$%^#&*! | 8 bits \$*\$&@% | | |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------------------|----|---------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| | | Th | າຍ | Second Si | ubkey | | |
| | | (P ₁ ,K ₁) | 1 | - | (P ₂ ,K ₂) | | |
| | 00010100 | 0.0010 | | 00010100 | 0.0010 | | |
| | 10110111 | 0.005 | | 10110111 | 0.005 | | |
| | 11011011 | 0.005 | | 11011011 | 0.005 | | |
| | 01000011 | 0.0045 | | 01000011 | 0.0045 | | |
| | 01110000 | 0.0043 | | 01110000 | 0.0043 | | |
| | 11011010 | 0.003 | | 11011010 | 0.003 | | |
| | 10101110 | 0.003 | | 10101110 | 0.003 | | |
| | 01001111 | 0.002 | | 01001111 | 0.002 | | |
| | 10100110 | 0.0015 | | 10100110 | 0.0015 | | |
| | | | | | | 1 | |
| | 0000000 | 0.000001 | | 0000000 | 0.000001 | | |
| | | | | | | | |

0.000001

11111111

11111111

0.000001

- d independent subkey spaces (K_i,P_i) each of size N
- **sorted** in decreasing order of proabilities.







- The attacker goes over the full keys
- in **sorted order** from the most likely to the least,
- till he reaches the correct key.







The **probability** of a **full key** is defined as the **product** of its **subkey's probabilities**.



An important question is:

How many full keys the attacker needs to try before he reaches the correct key.

This allows estimating the strength of the chosen secret key after an attack has been performed.







So assume we **know**

- The correct key k* and its probability
 p*
- The **d subkey spaces** (K_i,P_i)

The goal :

to estimate the **number of full keys** with **probability higher than p***

This is rank(k*)



 (P_d, K_d)







- The optimal solution
- enumerates and counts the full keys in optimal-order
- till reaches to k*











- However, key space size is 2¹²⁸
- Enumerating the whole key space in optimal-order is impossible
- Hence, estimating a rank without enumeration is of great interest.





Our Rank Estimation: Motivation for d=2



Our Rank Estimation: Motivation for d=2









Instantiating the framework

For *f* we select the **Pareto function**:

$$f(x) = \frac{a}{x^{\alpha}}$$

- Long tail
- Easy to calculate mutiple integral















The **asymptotic running time of finding all** the **Pareto** upper bounds of a given *P* is O(mN).

- Since typically *m* << *N* the algorithm is almost linear in *N* and very quick in practice.
- Furthermore, our implementation is very efficient: it allows skipping over hundreds of not relevant candidates which dramaticly impacts in practice.

After finding multiple candidates for Pareto upper bound of a given P,



We need to **select** the '**best**' function which lead to a **tight bound**.



We chose the following **criteria**:

Given

- P a non-increasing subkey probability distribution
- k the index of the correct subkey in P

Choose the Pareto upper bound function f s.t f(k) is the closest to P[k]

f(k) is the closest to P[k]



f(k) is the closest to P[k]



Estimating the Volume for d≥2

After we find the 'best' Pareto upper bound function f_i for each P_i

$$\forall x \ P_i[x] \le f_i(x) = \frac{a_i}{x^{\alpha_i}}$$

We need to calculate the number of $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_d)$ s.t.

 $f_1(x_1) \cdot f_2(x_2) \cdot \ldots \cdot f_d(x_d) \ge p^*$

using the multiple integral:

$$\int_{0}^{N} \int_{0}^{N} \dots \int_{0}^{N} 1 \, dx_{1} \, dx_{2} \dots dx_{d}$$
$$f_{1}(x_{1}) \cdot f_{2}(x_{2}) \cdot \dots \cdot f_{d}(x_{d}) \ge p^{*}$$

Estimating the Volume for d≥2

We solve the multiple integral:
$$\int_0^N \int_0^N \dots \int_0^N 1 \, dx_1 \, dx_2 \dots dx_d$$
$$f_1(x_1) \cdot f_2(x_2) \cdot \dots \cdot f_d(x_d) \ge p^*$$

using the Pareto upper bound functions $f_i(x) = \frac{a_i}{x^{\alpha_i}}$

We get the following closed formula:

$$\mathsf{rank}(p^*) \leq \sum_{i=1}^d \left[\left(\frac{1}{p^*} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^d a_j \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_i}} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^d \left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i - \alpha_j} \cdot N^{\frac{\alpha_i - \alpha_j}{\alpha_i}} \right) \right]$$

PRank: The Pareto Rank Estimation Algorithm

Given:

- d probability distibutions P_1, \ldots, P_d
- The correct key $k^* = (k_1, ..., k_d)$ and its probability p^*

Prank Algorithm:

for i = 1 to d:

 $a_i, \alpha_i \leftarrow$ upper bound P_i by a Pareto upper bound function

compute the closed formula:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left[\left(\frac{1}{p^*} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{d} a_j \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_i}} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{d} \left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i - \alpha_j} \cdot N^{\frac{\alpha_i - \alpha_j}{\alpha_i}} \right) \right]$$

Theoretical Worst-case Performance

for i = 1 to d:

Prank Algorithm

 $a_i, \alpha_i \leftarrow$ upper bound P_i by a Pareto upper bound function

compute the closed formula:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left[\left(\frac{1}{p^*} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{d} a_j \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_i}} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{d} \left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i - \alpha_j} \cdot N^{\frac{\alpha_i - \alpha_j}{\alpha_i}} \right) \right]$$

Space Complexity:

Only needs to keep a_i , α_i for every $1 \le i \le d$ Therefore O(d).

Theoretical Worst-case Performance

for i = 1 to d:

Prank Algorithm

 $a_i, \alpha_i \leftarrow$ upper bound P_i by a Pareto upper bound function

compute the closed formula:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left[\left(\frac{1}{p^*} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{d} a_j \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_i}} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{d} \left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i - \alpha_j} \cdot N^{\frac{\alpha_i - \alpha_j}{\alpha_i}} \right) \right]$$

Running Time:

Calculating the closed formula: $O(d^2)$

d additions each consists of d multiplications and d real-value power.

Theoretical Worst-case Performance

for i = 1 to d:

Prank Algorithm

 $a_i, \alpha_i \leftarrow$ upper bound P_i by a Pareto upper bound function

compute the closed formula:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left[\left(\frac{1}{p^*} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{d} a_j \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_i}} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^{d} \left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i - \alpha_j} \cdot N^{\frac{\alpha_i - \alpha_j}{\alpha_i}} \right) \right]$$

Running Time:

Finding the best Pareto upper bound for each P_i is $O(m_i \cdot N)$.

Since typically $\forall i \ m_i \ll N$,

the algorithm is almost linear in *dN* and very quick in practice.

Performance Evaluation

- We **compared** our **new PRank algorithm** with the **histogram** algorithm of Glowacz et al. [GGPSS15].
- We implemented both in Matlab.
- Our PRank code is available in gitHub.

Performance Evaluation

- We run PRank algorithm on 611 traces gathered from a specific SCA.
- The SCA was against AES with 128-bits keys.
- Each set in the corpus consists of the correct secret key and 16 distributions, one per subkey.
- The distributions are sorted in non-increasing order of probability, each of length 2⁸.

Performance Evaluation

- We measured the time and the accuracy for each trace using PRank and the histograms rank estimation, in two different configurations.
 - d=16 and n=2⁸
 - d=8 and n=2¹⁶

We used the **histogram rank** as the **x-axis** in our resulting graphs.

Space Utilization



| | B= | B=50K | | | |
|--------|----------|-------|------|---------------|-------------------|
| d = 8 | 24 bytes | 80KB | 24 b | $_{\rm ytes}$ | 800KB |
| d = 16 | 48 bytes | 160KB | 48 b | ytes | $1.6 \mathrm{MB}$ |

The **memory consumption of PRank algorithm is drastically lower** than the histogram space consumption.

The PRank space consumption is trivial 3d

The histogram space requirements are around 2Bd

Runtime Analysis

The PRank running time consists of:

- **finding** the **Pareto upper bound** function of each probability distribution
- **calculating** the **closed formula** given the secret key.

The histogram running time consists of:

- converting each probability distribution into a histogram
- **finding** the **sum of the corresponding bins** given the secret key.

Runtime Analysis

PRank, for both d=8 and d=16, typically

takes only a few milliseconds to complete

and **runs faster** than the Histograms in its 4 configurations.



Runtime Analysis

Prank with **d=16 runs faster** than PRank with d=8

since the **length N** of each distribution is **shorter**.



The Figure illustrates the **PRank upper bound** with **d=16**, **d=8** and the **histogram rank**, all in **number of bits** (log2).

x-axis is the **number of bits** of **histogram** rank, hence its curve is a straight line.

PRank with d=8 PRank with d=16



The figure clearly shows that it is **advantageous** to **reduce** the **dimension d**.

The **accuracy** of PRank's estimation is **quite good**:

for ranks between 2⁸⁰–2¹⁰⁰ : The median **PRank** bound is **less than 10 bits** above the histogram rank.

PRank with d=8 PRank with d=16



The **accuracy** of PRank's estimation is **quite good**:

for high ranks above 2¹⁰⁰: The median **PRank** bound is **less than 4 bits** more.



The **accuracy** of PRank's estimation is **quite good**:

For small ranks, around 2³⁰:

PRank gave a bound which is roughly20 bits greater than that of thehistogram.

However such ranks are within reach of key enumeration so rank estimation is not particularly interesting there.

PRank with d=8 PRank with d=16



We **chose Pareto** upper bound functions. This choise clearly **effects the received accuracy**.

However,

- one could **employ** our **framework**
- with other classes of upper-bound functions
- and possibly achieve even better results.

We leave this direction for future research.

Conclusions

- In this paper we proposed a new framework for rank estimation, that is conceptually simple, faster and use less memory than previous proposals.
- Our main idea is to **bound each subkey distribution** by an **analytical function**, and then estimate the rank by a **closed formula**.
- To **instantiate** the framework we use **Pareto functions** to upperbound the empirical distributions.

Conclusions

- We **fully characterized** such upper-bounding functions and **developed** an **efficient algorithm** to find them.
- We then used Pareto functions to **develop a new explicit closed** formula upper bound on the rank of a given key.
- Combined with the algorithm to find the upper-bounding Pareto functions, we obtained a rank upper-bound estimation algorithm we call **PRank**.